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I. INTRODUCTION
Leon Higginbotham was, and will always be, an original. As the
world has long recognized, he was a distinguished jurist, an unyielding
advocate on and off the bench for racial justice in the United States and
throughout the world, and an indefatigable scholar of the legal history of
race in the United States. He was also a mentor to generations of law
clerks and law students, many of whom he selected for positions based in
part on their own passion and dedication. These proteges now inhabit
many important seats of influence across the United States-a legacy, I
think, that might make him almost as proud as any other.
Few judges in the history of our country will ever equal his energy
and passion or his commitment to improving the lot of his fellow man.
For the Judge, these activities went far beyond his judicial role. They in
cluded service on a number of int1uential commissions, advising institu
tions and countries on racial and other social policies, and, last but by no
means least, awakening and energizing a generation through his truly
remarkable speeches and writings outlining the affirmative role we all
should play in improving the world around us.
He was, of course, all of these things-and more. He was a loving fa
ther, a dedicated (but not great) tennis player, and a relentless (but also
not highly successful) dieter. (The latter is a trait that I shared with him
and about which I commiserated with him often.) He was tall and statu
esque and blessed with a deep and booming voice that commanded any
room he entered or any group he addressed. At the same time, his speech
was often punctuated with those delightful, high-pitched giggles when he
relaxed with friends or staff and put all around him at ease. All of these
qualities combined to make him as engaging and delightful a person, yet
as thoughtful and relentless an advocate for the betterment of the legal
system and the society around him, as T have ever known. In short, there
was and will never be anyone quite like him-not even close.
The purpose of this Essay, however, is not to detail his public accom
plishments. Those participating in this and similar symposia held in the
past year have already conveyed eloquently the extraordinary breadth
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and range of the Judge's contributions to the betterment of the legal sys
tem and society around him.1 Precisely because those public efforts have
been so well documented, I would like to focus here on a more personal
aspect of the Judge's life and personality-his distinctive judgment, or, to
use a current academic labet his practical wisdom. Anthony Kronman has
aptly characterized this capacity in judges as "the ability to live and work
in what [Alexander Bickel called] the Lincolnian tension between a soci
ety's ideat on the one hand, and the reality of its present situation, on the
other."2 Kronman goes on to observe, "The main job of the [courts] is to
guide the process of societal self-reform through which existing laws and
practice are reshaped in the image of our deepest ideals."3
That is clearly the role the Judge assumed for himself and which
guided all of his diverse public roles. More importantly, the Judge's abil
ity to navigate this complex process, I think, was an extremely important
ingredient in the remarkable success he enjoyed in so many different
types of public spheres-as a trial judge, as an appellate judge, as a legal
scholar, as a public and inspirational speaker, and as a public advisor and
advocate for social change. For the organizers of this symposium who
have asked that these essays engage the Judge's academic interests, this
commentary also affords an opportunity to explore indirectly an issue
that intrigued him and a host of other academics in recent years: what
type of qualities serve as a source of judgment as well as leadership in our
public figures today. Such attributes help us understand those individu
als, such as the Judge, who are able to rise above their circumstances and
pursue a social vision.
II. THE COMPLEX INGREDIENTS OF WISDOM AND LEADERSHIP
While many academics, including the Judge, have written with great
insight about practical wisdom over the years, the place he would have
started the discussion is with a story.� Let me, once again, follow his lead.
I first began to be aware of the Judge's peculiar judgment late one
night many years ago soon after I first began clerking for him in 1979.
Fresh out of law schoot I was quite enamored with all of the latest and
fashionable academic theories. Law was first beginning to fully embrace
its tremendously important move toward interdisciplinary inquiry-a
development with which I was then, and still am, quite fascinated. Not
heeding the Judge's cautionary words, however, I was all too captivated

1. Needless to say, they are truly remarkable. See, e.g., Symposium, In Memorin!ll: A Leon
Higgillbotlwm, Jr., 112 HARV. L. REv. 1801 (1999); Dedication, In Honor of A. Leon Hig
ginbothanl, Jr., 142 U. PA. L. REv. 511 (1993); Symposium, Honoring Judge A. Leon Hig
ginbothnlll, Jr., 9 LAw & INEQ. J. 383 (1991). In the last eighteen months moving memo
rial services have been held at Harvard University, New York University, the Univer
sity of Pennsy lvania, and Yale University, among other places.
2. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN: THE LosT LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PrwFEssroN
24 (1993) (summarizing the work of Bickel).
.) . /d. at 24-25.
4. For a discussion of the Judge's successful usc of stories in his speeches and writings,
sec infm text accompanying note 37.
'>
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by "how bright [my] colleagues [were.]"5 The case before us that evening
dealt with an issue that I argued should be resolved through a somewhat
technical economic/ statistical analysis. (I can't remember the exact sub
ject matter, but the substance is less important than the method.) The
Judge and I went back and forth about whether the statistical analysis
could or should resolve the issue. While the Judge loved statistics, he re
mained skeptical about their application in this instance. After some fur
ther discussion, he finally turned to me and said, "Look, Mike, the model
may seem right, but you have to take this statistical approach with a grain
of salt. If I thought all statistics were always determinative, I would still
be living in Trenton."6
At the time, I only had a vague sense of the underlying significance of
the Judge's retort, but I have thought about it quite often since that De
cember evening. Like all great individuals, the sources of the Judge's pas
sion and insight were complex. As his comment indicated, he had great
faith in immersing oneself in the facts of a case or problem. At the same
time, he had a intuitive faith that one needed to see through those facts
when the problem demanded it. The confluence of these two impulses
was both an intriguing paradox and, in the end, a source of his greatness.
Let me explain.
On the one hand, the Judge was, almost above everything else, the
consummate, fact-driven and fact-bound thinker, long before this process
had become academically fashionable, as it has in recent years.7 This ob
servation may seem odd to those who have become familiar with him
only through some of his more public and inspirational roles, such as tes
tifying on impeachment or speaking out on the injustices in South Africa.
But his judicial colleagues and clerks certainly would not be surprised.
One Third Circuit friend correctly described him as "basically a centrist
judge, respectful of precedent and judicial tradition,''8 not someone who
would "push beyond the limits of the law."9 Indeed, the Judge himself

5. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas franz a Federnl

Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L . REv. 1005, 1010 (1992). The Judge wrote his well
known letter to Justice Thomas on the occasion of the latter's elevation to the Su

preme Court. For a discussion of this issue, see infm text accompanying notes 12-15,
33.
6. The quote is a paraphrase. The advancing years have reduced my ability to reca

pitulate the exact words.
Higginbotham's recognition of the need to take chances and move beyond the
past was well captured in another story he frequently told about when he was
growing up in Trenton, and expressed to his mother a desire to become a fireman.
(At the time, the occupation was closed to blacks, and his goal on one level might
have been seen as quite ambitious. ) His mother, who was a towering presence in his
life, advised him not to think about being a fireman, that his aspirations should be

much higher. He took great delight in that episode, especially what it showed about
his mother 's character and her own ability to see beyond the statistical odds and en
vision a better future. It was a lesson he carried with him the rest of his life.

7. Sec gcncmlly C:;.ss R. Su:-.�STEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JuDIClAL MrNIMALISM

ON THE

SuPREME CouRT (1999); RrcHARD A. PosNm, THE P ROBLEMATICS OF MoRAL AND LE
GAL THEORY

(1999); RICHARD A. PoSNER, OvERCOMING LAw (1995); David A Strauss,

Co111111011 Lllw Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996).
8. Edward
(1999).
9. John P.

R. Becker, In Mellloriam: A. Leon Higginbotlzn111, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1813, 1815

Frcmk, Ginnt: A f-Iigginbotlllllll Me111oir, 142 U.

PA. L. REv. 521,527 (1993).
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would call his opinions "[not] 'black opinions,' [but] 'black-letter opin
ions."'10 He loved facts and believed that an immersion in the facts,
whether it be in a trial record or the history of slavery in the 1800s, would
be the greatest source of wisdom and insight. In other words, he truly be
lieved, in the famous words of Justice Holmes that he so often quoted,
"[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic."11
There was no better illustration of this impulse than the Judge's re
sponse to Clarence Thomas's elevation to the Supreme Court. In Higgin
botham's well known letter advising the Justice on how to approach his
new tasks, the Judge exhorted Thomas, first and foremost, to "reflect
more deeply on legal history than you ever have before."12 What Thomas
should not do, the Judge cautioned, was to become entranced by "how
bright your colleagues [on the Court] are."13 As the Judge frequently
pointed out, many of the Justices of the Court that decided Plessy v.
Ferguson,14 had graduated from some of the nation's most prestigious law
schools; the greatest insights, he was convinced, came from knowing the
historical facts.15
At the same time, and this is the intriguing point, the Judge under
stood instinctively the need to see through those facts and think imagina
tively with vision when the situation demanded it. That was the import of
his retort about remaining in Trenton. The critical gift, of course, is to
know when and how to exercise that discretion and leadership; that is,
when to use the moral capital accumulated over a series of cases and roles
and pursue a greater vision. This is when the Judge was at his best,
whether it was during impeachment hearings or denying recusal in a race
discrimination case. On those occasions, "He used his post as a bully pul
pit to encourage a better society when he could not mandate its change."16
vVhile some might see this combination of fact and vision as a contradic
tion, it was not. Indeed, it was the foundation of the Judge's ability to be a
leader in so many different and varied contexts. For him, the facts limited
but at the same time informed that vision, and were a major source of his
energy
This complex, dialectical approach, which has been the subject of
much study and comment within the legal academy in recent years, raises
the age-old question about what makes a great and wise decision-maker,
and, when the situation demands it, a leader. For some, the great judge is
thought of as a "Hercules," imposing his values from the insights that he
derives from aboveY I think, howeve1� that Higginbotham's approach
reflected an older philosophy, which has acquired much support of late,
and is aptly described in Anthony Kronman' s important book on the

10. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Legal Scizolor to Take He/111 of the Third Circuit, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1989, at B20 (quoting Higginbotham).
11. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
12. Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 1014.
13. Id. at 1010.
14. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
15. See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 1009.
16. Frank, supra note 9, at 529.
17. Cf RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986) (developing a theory of law by depicting
the approach to adjudication of an ideal judge).
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practical wisdom of lawyers, The Lost Lawyer. There, Kronman shows how
lawyers historically have had a special role in exercising judgment
through their capacity to advise and represent their clients-that is, in
their relationship to actual cases. The same is true for judges. As Kronman
puts it,
Judges are disciplined by the specificity of the cases they must de
cide, and this discipline not only puts a limit to the speculative
theorizing in which they may engage, but is also bound to remind
them, as they go about their work, of the value of deliberative
wisdom-the wisdom that consists in a knowledge of particulars
and that no general theory can provide.18
While Kronman insists that we have lost this traditional role in the mod
ern practice of law, the Judge, who was as forward-looking as they come,
embodied many of these same qualities in his judicial and scholarly ap
proach.
Yet obviously, Higginbotham was far more than simply a wise com
mon-law decision-maker. He also knew, in his judicial and extrajudicial
roles, when and how to be a public leader. This latter connection is ex
plored in a complementary study of political and social leadership by
Howard Gardner, Leading Minds.19 Gardner argues that political visionar
ies exhibit a capacity to understand and capture an underlying ideal of
their society and articulate that ideal to the public at large. In other
words, they understand the Lincolnian tension and move effectively to
make the public aware of it and to reduce its gap. Stories, something the
Judge used in his opinions and speeches with distinction, are also critical
in this process, according to Gardner, both in capturing the essence of a
social ideal and communicating that vision to the public at large. The in
choate ability to connect the "is" and the "ought"-a relationship that has
absorbed philosophers since time immemorial-is ultimately what dis
tinguishes good judgment in our judges and wise political leaders.
The Judge's personal background and underlying social philosophy
serve as an illuminating and forceful illustration of those qualities-prac
tical wisdom and vision-that one finds in great judicial, legal, and politi
cal leaders. Not coincidently, in his own writing on legal history and the
judicial role, he repeatedly confronted this same question of how one ex
ercises practical wisdom and leadership, subject to the institutional and
psychological constraints in which we all operate.20
III. THE JUDGE AS LEGAL HISTORIAN
There is no better example of this inclination in the Judge than in his
indefatigable determination to study legal history. Certainly he became
interested in writing a definitive legal account of race in the United States

18. KRONNIA:--J", supm note 2, at 319.
19. HOWARD GARDNER, LEADING MINDS: AN AN,\TOii!Y OF LEADERSHIP (1995).
20. In

his studies on U.S. history, tl1e Judge constantly asked when were individuals able

to rise abo,·e the limited options thot oppearccl to constrain their l·vorld and exercise
the discretion to make the world

a

better pbce.
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because he recognized this legacy had been inadequately treated in the
law schools and legal treatises, resulting in insufficient appreciation for
the tortured history of slavery and race.21 As a judge and advocate for ra
cial justice in the United States, he also believed the past was of enduring
significance in understanding our continuing moral obligation to write
the legal wrongs that had been committed against African Americans in
the United States.
But this history was also important for what it taught us about the
related and enduring question of how we should exercise moral choice. In
this regard, in his prize-winning book on the early colonial period, In the
Matter of Color, the Judge took special interest in the lost promise of Geor
gia, which originally outlawed slavery but later reneged.22 Pennsylvania
was also critical to the moral analysis, for it was here, in 1688, that the
first anti-slavery forces gathered in Germantown.23
Why did certain colonies break away from the slave system at early
points, while others did not? What influenced Georgia to backtrack and
re-institute slavery? His fascination with the options available to judges
during this period revealed a similar dilemma; time and time again, he
wanted to understand what choices were available within legal precedent
and how the judiciary exercised those options. Did judges have the
authority to choose freedom, he would often ask, or were they formally
and prudentially constrained? In some instances, as in the famous Somer
set v. Stewart case in England that he loved to quote, Lord Mansfield exer
cised that discretion in favor of emancipation, proclaiming, "[F]iat justitia,
ruat coelum," that is, "[L]et justice be done whatever be the conse
quence." 24 Unfortunately, he found that time and time again they failed to
pursue available options. What explained the difference? The question
absorbed him.
Needless to say, in part for this reason, the Judge's historical explora
tions were exhaustively detailed. The facts were exceedingly important
for him as a judge as well as a scholar. As a result, all the colonial cases
had to be analyzed and processed, all the states included in the history. To
the scholar, as with the trial judge, the morality and moral compass
would rise through the facts, not be imposed on them. He was always
skeptical of grand theorizing, whether it was found in law review articles
or judges' opinions that strayed far from the facts and the world with
which they were most acquainted.
Of course, some might detect a somewhat ahistorical quality to this
philosophy. Nlany historians conceive of their role as explaining and un
derstanding outcomes solely in their historical context. David Strauss has

21. Sec A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Book Review, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1044, 1049 (1974) (re
vicvving DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RAcrs1v1 AND A:t\IERICAN LAW (1973)) (noting that
Bell's work was the first casebook of its kind and asserting that "one of the v al ues of
Professor Bell's book is that it gives some, but probably not enough, of the history of
past racial deprivations so that today's problems can be understood in an appropri
ate legal and historical context.").

22. Sec A. LEON HrcctNBOTHAM, ]R., IN THE :tvlATTER OF CoLOR: R.�\CE A0JD THE Ai\tERI
CAN LEGAL PRocEss, THE CoLONIAL Pmroo 216-66 (1978).
23. Sec id. Cit 267-310.
24. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. (Lufft) 499, 509 (K.B. 1772).
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characterized this as a "genuine effort to understand, in context, an earlier
time/'25 not to moralize about it, as lawyers frequently do, from the van
tage point of our present ethical compass. But legal arguments, as Strauss
has also pointed out, "don't depend on [immersive] reconstruction [of the
original context.] They depend on making selective use of the wisdom of
the past, modified by normative considerations, to address current prob
lems."26 The Judge's work was a tour de force in bridging these two roles.
Viewed from this synthetic perspective, the underlying purpose of the
Judge's project was to understand when social actors are able to rise
above their circumstances, and when they are not, as evidenced by the
failure of the American legal system to confront slavery. As he wrote in
the introduction to In the Matter of Color, the central question motivating
the inquiry was whether "the law merely perpetuate[d] old biases and
prejudices" or whether it had "been an instrument . . . in establishing ...
injustices based on color."27 In short, he wanted "to ascertain to what ex
tent the law itself had created the mores of racial repression."28 The legal
system, from this perspective, was an independent moral agent. For thE:
Judge, this was the fundamental historical and moral legal issue-the
failure of our legal system and its representatives, judges acting under the
common law and state statute, to pursue those options available to them
that would have enabled them to protect and assist African Americans.29
IV

HIGGINBOTHAM AS A TRIAL AND APPELLATE JUDGE

This same Lincolnian tension, between the ideals of society and its re
ality, is also, of course, an everyday dilemma for a sitting judge. Higgin
botham was and is rightly known as a strong advocate for using the law
and Constitution as a means of pursuing racial and gender justice. Yet the
institutional issues of the judicial role constantly gnawed at him. In this
context, as in his legal history, Higginbotham let the facts constrain, but,
at the same time, inform his social vision.
On the one hand, as I have noted, he was no radical judicial activist.
While he could be a pioneer when the circumstances demanded it, he was
judicious in his choice of the moment. Just as he was absorbed with re
vealing the genuine options for judges acting in the 1700s and dealing
with slave cases, he was constantly concerned with the breadth that lay

25. David Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle 7 (1999)
26.
27.
28.
29.

(tmpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) .

Id. at 19.

HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 22, at ix.
Id. (emphasis added).

In this respect, the Judge had immense respect for those pioneers who toiled without

public acclaim or nati onal recognition , but who took on the cause, despite their lim

ited office. There were many figures drawn from his historical research , but there
were also many other, more current figures. Of particular interest were such unher
alded notables as Charles Hamilton Houston and Austin Norris in Philadelphia, who
at an early age waged a battle for racial justice when the costs were high and the per
sonal payoffs quite modest. His clerks learned about their achievments in what can

now be d e scr ibed as oral history. H igginbotha m understood that, in part because of
his special gifts and his place in history, he might be better known than these earlier

pioneers At the same time, he well understood their importance to the cause he held
so dear.
.
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before him as a judge, as suggested by his aforementioned comment to a
New York Times reporter, " I don't write 'black opinions,' I write 'black
letter opinions."'30 He was not, as his good friend John Gibbons observed
at his memorial service, a legal radical who sought to push the law be
yond its social and historical grounds. In this sense, he shared a view that
has since found increasing support in the academy about the value and
wisdom in thinking and morally theorizing through specific facts. There
has been an explosion in scholarship exploring this poinV1 and the Judge
understood it instinctively early on, in his judging and in his own writ
mg.
Indeed, this respect for facts led him, on many issues, to be quite def
erential in his legal philosophy to other institutions that might be in better
command of the record. For example, he tended to believe in deference to
administrative agencies (perhaps a result of his service on the FTC) and in
deference to the fact finding of the trial court judge (in part a result of his
confidence in the wisdom flowing from the trier of fact). In these cases, I
suspect he understood that other institutions-trial judges and adminis
trative agencies-might be in a better position to understand what was
really going on.
At the same time, there would be those occasions when something
about the case or the doctrine would impel him to use a case to move the
law or the public imagination. Certainly his passionate opinion in the Op
erating Engineers decision,32 when he refused to recuse himself in a race
discrimination case when it was claimed he could not be impartial be
cause he was black, or his famous letter to Justice Thomas on the moral
obligations of being a Justice,33 are only two of countless examples.
V

THE JUDGE'S CONNECTION WITH PEOPLE

The Judge's ability to know when and how to seize the moment and
to be an effective advocate was directly related, I suspect, to his intuitive
understanding of the human personality. The Judge loved people-con
necting with them, identifying with them, figuring out what made them
tick, no matter the walk of life from which they came, no matter what
their political stripes. As a student fresh out of law school, I received no
better education than the late night conferences with the Judge, in which
he would expound on the real motivations behind the litigants in the
case-as well as a host of other figures, including political or academic
leaders in Philadelphia and the country at large. I heard stories about the
lives of the women and men who cleaned the t1oor in the entrance hall
way at the courthouse as well as those of presidents and cabinet secretar
ies. He could be very practical in his assessrnents, but he was always, at
the same time, exceedingly compassionate and insightful. For, above all
else, he liked people, especially if they were pas sion ate about what they
were doing. In my own case, my fundamental relationship with him

30. Hinds, supra note 10 (quoting Higginbotham).
31. See supra note 7 (providing examples of such scholarship).
32. Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
1974).
33. Higginbotham, supra note 5.

388 F.

Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa.
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changed little from the first moment I began work for him as a research
assistant, to the point when, as the associate dean at Penn, I recruited him
to join the law faculty as a Senior Fellow while still on the bench.
This is precisely the quality one expects to find in a great judge-a
sort of imaginative sympathy and compassion, as well as detachment. It
is also a trait one expects to find in a great leader. As Howard Gardner
has observed, an effective leader "must be able to address a public in
terms of the commonsense and commonplace notions that an ordinary
inhabitant absorbs simply by virtue of living for some years within a so
ciety."34 To achieve this success, they are also "typically inclusive."35 That
was the Judge's perspective on life. Despite the high level of potential
conflict skirting many of the racial and legal issues he addressed, Higgin
botham's language and vision were always inclusive and positive. Not
surprisingly, his favorite poem was Langston Hughes's Dream of Freedom,
which concludes with the famous lines, "This dream today embattled,
With its back against the wall-, To save the dream for one, It must be
saved for All."36
Higginbotham recognized that his selection of law clerks was one
method for furthering this vision. In culling through the hundreds of ap
plications, he looked for a high level of technical competence. He also
looked for a sense of passion and social commitment that would connect
them over their careers to people from all different walks of life. Thus,
they had to have a devotion to finding the facts and had to be superb
technicians, but, at the same time, they had to have a feeling for rising
above those facts. Over the years the result was a chambers as diverse in
backgrounds and interests as probably any in the United States. In many
ways, it was a microcosm of the Judge's views of what society might be.
The result of this philosophy was remarkable. One has seldom seen a
more diverse or multifaceted group, nor a crew more dedicated to
changing the society around them. The list of current occupations is im
pressive and unusual; beyond the traditional law partners, it includes
cabinet secretaries, judges, high government officials, distinguished law
professors, and important social activists. The collective is a testament to
his own technical abilities as a judge-and his passion for knowing when
and how to rise above the technical to imagine the different.
Finally, no discussion of the Judge's social ideals and philosophy
would be complete without reference to his extraordinary rhetorical
prowess. The Judge's ability to move an audience was an integral part of
his leadership. As Howard Gardner has observed, great leaders often
"achieve success [by] construct[ing] and convincingly communicat[ing] a
clear and persuasive story."37 In the Judge's account of his own life and
his original attraction to the law, and in his stories about the lives of
slaves and the few judges who responded to their needs, the Judge pur
sued this approach to perfection. He was a master at balancing the sense
of complexity and the sense of judgment. No one I have heard could turn

34. GARDNER, suprn note 19, at 12.
35. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
36. LANGSTON HuGHES, Dream of Freedom, irz THE CoLLECTED PoEi\IS OF LANGSTON
HuGHES 542,542 (Arnold. Rampersild ed 1964).
37. GARDNER, supra note 19, at 302.
. .
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a phrase, or reduce a point to a wonderful story, better than Higgin
botham. In this regard, it is no accident that when he graduated from law
schoot the Judge had garnered more awards for oral advocacy than any
other student in memory . Long before legal academics had explored the
importance of stories to human understanding and motivation, the Judge
demonstrated their potency as part of his everyday professional diet.
In the end, though, all of these capabilities were used toward one ob
jective. In all of his judiciat politicat and public roles, the Judge's ulti
mate goal was to confront the fundamental Lincolnian tension between
the ideals and reality of our society. His comments on Brown v. Board of
Education38 serve as a final and illuminating example. While some scholars
in recent years have reluctantly questioned the impact of opinions such as
Brown in transforming society through judicial decree,39 Higginbotham
emphasized its long-term effect on general social values. As he wrote of the
opinion, it "changed the moral tone of America; by eliminating the le
gitimization of state-imposed racism it implicitly questioned racism
wherever it was used."40 In this sense, Higginbotham appreciated the
significance of sy mbolism and ideas as much as anyone. His own schol
arly and public efforts repeatedly highlighted the Lincolnian tension. He
knew he needed to earn the respect of his colleagues and the public while,
at the same moment, making clear the need to reduce the chasm between
present reality and aspirational ideals. As much as any thing else, the
ability to bridge this gap was the source of his influence and, ultimately,
his greatness.

38. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
39. See, e.g., GERALD RosENBERG,
CHANGE? (1991).
40.

THE Houow HoPE: CAN CouRTS BRTNG ABOUT SociAL

Higginbotham, supm note 5, at

1Cl17-18.

